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I. INTRODUCTION
A foreign traveler flies into John F. Kennedy International

Airport, supposedly on a business trip.1 At the airport, a customs
inspector detains him after discovering what appear to be bags of
cocaine concealed in his luggage. 2 The traveler speaks limited English,
so the inspector requests the aid of a certified government interpreter
to
question
him. 3 An
English-speaking
Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") agent thereafter interrogates the traveler by
having the interpreter translate his questions to Spanish, the
traveler's native tongue. 4 The interpreter then translates the
traveler's responses from Spanish to English, and the inspector
records the translated responses. 5 At trial, the court denies the
traveler's motion to suppress his statements to the customs inspector

and DEA agent.6 The jury subsequently convicts him. 7
This fact pattern comes from an influential Second Circuit case
illustrating an evidentiary tool long used by courts to assess the
reliability of out-of-court, translated statements offered against
criminal defendants. Popularly referred to as the "language conduit
theory," this tool allows courts to infer an agency relationship between
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 829 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 830.
Id.
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a defendant and an interpreter for hearsay purposes if certain factors
are met.8 These factors vary among the federal circuits but generally
aim to ensure that translations are reliable. For instance, courts often
ask if the interpreter had a motive to mislead or if there is reason to
believe that the translation is inaccurate. 9 If the facts suggest that the
statements are reliable, then they are admissible as nonhearsay under
Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) or (D).1o
Although federal courts initially designed the language conduit
theory as an evidentiary tool, they gradually extended its reasoning to
the
Sixth
Amendment
context. 1
The
Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause grants every defendant the right to confront the
witnesses against him. 12 Thus, a strict textualist reading indicates
that defendants have the right to confront their interpreters when
prosecutors seek to introduce the translated statements against them.
However, courts and prosecutors have often invoked the language
conduit theory to circumvent this constitutional requirement.13 If the
theory's factors support a finding that the interpreter's statements are
reliable, then the statements can be attributed to the defendant
himself and properly admitted as nonhearsay. 14 Under this logic, the

8.
E.g., id. at 831 32. Another similar evidentiary tool used by some state courts to admit
out-of-court, translated statements is the residual, or "catchall," exception based on Rule 803(24)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under this hearsay exception, a statement bearing sufficient
"guarantees of trustworthiness" is admissible if the proffering party shows that the statement is
relevant, that it is more probative than any other reasonably available evidence, and that the
purpose of the hearsay rules and the interests of justice will be served by admitting the
statement. See State v. Terrazas, 783 P.2d 803, 806 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); State v. RodriguezCastillo, 151 P.3d 931, 938 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), reu'd on other grounds, 188 P.3d 268 (Or. 2008).
This exception raises a more glaring Confrontation Clause issue than the language conduit
theory. See Joseph S. Powell, Note, No Comprende, No Justice: An Analysis ofApplying Hearsay
Exceptions to Interpreted Statements and the Impact on Jowa's Increasingly Diverse Residents,
Workforce, and Justice System, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 759, 775-77 (2009); infra Part II.A B.
9.
Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 832. Many circuits have adopted four common factors to evaluate
the accuracy of a translation: (1) which party supplied the interpreter; (2) whether the
interpreter had a motive to mislead or distort; (3) the interpreter's qualifications and language
skills; and (4) whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the
statements translated. See United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Martinez-Gaytan, 213 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nazemian, 948
F.2d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1991).
10. Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 832. Specifically, the interpreter's statements could be viewed as
either authorized by the defendant or made by an agent or employee of the defendant on a
matter within the scope of their relationship. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C)-(D).
11. E.g., Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 525 27.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. See, e.g., Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 525 27 (applying the language conduit test as a
"threshold matter" to determine whether the interpreter's statements could be properly viewed
as the defendant's own before reaching the Confrontation Clause issue).
14. See id. at 527 28.
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defendant cannot complain that he was denied the opportunity to
confront himself.15
Until recently, the language conduit, as applied in the Sixth
Amendment context, met little opposition across federal circuits. But
in 2004, the Supreme Court held in Crawford v. Washington that
"testimonial statements" of an unavailable witness could not be
admitted unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness. 16 Admitting such statements would violate the
Confrontation Clause. 17 Since this landmark decision, federal circuits
have disagreed on whether the language conduit theory remains a
viable tool to deny defendants the right to confront their
interpreters.1 8
This Note analyzes the continued validity of the language
conduit theory in the wake of Crawford and its progeny. Part II traces
the evolution of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence from Ohio v. Roberts through the Crawford line of cases
and provides a brief history of the language conduit theory before
Crawford. Part III analyzes three different approaches that federal
circuits have taken in dealing with the language conduit theory in
light of Crawford. Lastly, Part IV proposes a solution that closely
embodies the spirit of Crawford: requiring confrontation for all
translated statements that are testimonial hearsay.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ohio v. Roberts: The Confrontation Clause Does Not Bar the
Admission of Reliable Hearsay Evidence Against Defendants
Before 2004, the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence gave judges broad discretion to assess the reliability
and admissibility of hearsay evidence against criminal defendants.19
Specifically, in Ohio v. Roberts, the Court held that hearsay
statements offered against a defendant are admissible, in accordance
with the Sixth Amendment's confrontation requirement, if the
prosecution shows that the declarant is unavailable to testify and that
15. Id. at 525-26.
16. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-59 (2004).
17. Id.
18. Compare United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1327 30 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding
that the language conduit theory could not resolve the Confrontation Clause issue), with United
States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139-1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Crawford did not
foreclose the use of the language conduit theory to circumvent Confrontation Clause issues).
19. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ("The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested
by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability.").
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the statements bear adequate "indicia of reliability." 20 This "indicia of
reliability" test requires that the evidence falls within a "firmly rooted
hearsay
exception"
or
bears
"particularized guarantees
of
trustworthiness." 21
Because
these
factors
were
judicial
determinations, courts possessed broad discretion to determine
whether a hearsay statement violated the Confrontation Clause.
The Roberts Court formulated its test based on the observation
that the Framers did not intend for the Confrontation Clause to
exclude all hearsay evidence absent the opportunity for confrontation
at trial.22 Otherwise, the Clause would abrogate virtually every
common-law hearsay exception, a result that courts have long
rejected. 2 3 The Roberts Court thus valued consistency between the
hearsay and Confrontation Clause analyses. It believed that
statements that would otherwise be properly admissible under the
hearsay rules should also be admissible under the Confrontation
Clause, at least in situations in which the declarant is genuinely
unavailable
to
testify. 2 4 The
underlying rationale for this
interpretation is that both the hearsay rules and Confrontation Clause
aim to determine the reliability of evidence. Therefore, if evidence is
sufficiently reliable to be admitted under the hearsay rules, the
Confrontation Clause should not operate to bar its admission. 25 In
sum, the Roberts Court was satisfied with the ability of the hearsay
rules to assess reliability and did not read the Sixth Amendment as
conferring an absolute right to confrontation.
B. Crawford v. Washington: A Witness's Testimonial Statements Are
Inadmissible Absent the Opportunity for Confrontation
In
2004, the Supreme
Court overruled
Roberts in
Crawford v. Washington.26 In doing so, the Court held that the
Confrontation
Clause
forbids the admission of "testimonial
statements" of a witness who does not appear at trial unless the
witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior

20. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 63.
23. See id. at 62-63.
24. Id. at 65-66.
25. See id. at 66 ("[H]earsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to
protect similar values . . . and stem from the same roots." (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 155 (1970) and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
26. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004).
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opportunity to cross-examine him. 2 7 Unlike Roberts, Crawford
endorsed confrontation as the best tool for determining reliability of
hearsay evidence. 28 The Court noted that although the Clause's
ultimate goal is to ensure the reliability of evidence, it is a "procedural
rather than a substantive guarantee." 29 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court carefully examined the historical background of the
Confrontation Clause.
1. History of the Right to Confrontation in England
The Crawford Court began by discussing the infamous 1603
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in which the absence of confrontation
deprived Raleigh of a fair trial. 30 Cobham, Raleigh's alleged
accomplice, had implicated him in a pretrial examination and letter. 3 1
At trial, Raleigh argued that Cobham had lied to save himself and
demanded that the judges call him to appear in court. 32 When the
judges refused, the jury convicted Raleigh, and he was sentenced to
death. 33 Due to the unjust outcome of this case, 34 English law later
developed a right to confrontation and relatively strict rules regarding
witness unavailability. 35
Raleigh's case did not resolve the question of whether an
unavailable witness's pretrial examination could be admitted without
giving the defendant an opportunity for cross-examination. 3 6 In 1696,
however, an English court held in the misdemeanor libel case of
King v. Paine that even if a witness was dead, his testimony was not
admissible unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine
him. 37 In the mid-nineteenth century, Parliament formally extended
this common-law requirement to felony cases as well.38

27. Id. at 53-54, 59.
28. Id. at 61.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 44.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. One of Raleigh's trial judges later lamented that "the justice of England has never been
so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh." Id. (quoting
1 D. JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 435, 520 (1832)).
35. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45.
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 47.
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2. History of the Right to Confrontation in the United States
The right to confrontation in the United States originated in
the early days of our nation's history. At the Massachusetts ratifying
convention of the federal Constitution, Abraham Holmes objected to
the absence of such a right for fear that it would lead to the civil-law
practice of acquiring evidence by ex parte testimony. 39 Similarly, a
prominent antifederalist writing under the pseudonym "Federal
Framer" criticized the use of written evidence and the omission of a
right to cross-examine witnesses. 40 In response, the First Congress
included the Confrontation Clause in a proposal that later became the
Sixth Amendment. 4 1
Early state court decisions also shed light upon the original
understanding of the common-law right to confrontation. 4 2 In
State v. Webb, a case decided a mere three years after the adoption of
the Sixth Amendment, the court held that only depositions taken in
an accused's presence could be read against him. 4 3 Rejecting a broader
reading of English authorities, the court held that "no man shall be
prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross
examine." 44 Similarly, in State v. Campbell, South Carolina's highest
court excluded an ex parte deposition taken by a coroner in the
absence of the accused. 45 The court noted that the South Carolina
Constitution implicitly guaranteed the accused the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. 4 6
3.

The Original Meaning of the Confrontation Clause

From an analysis of the common-law history of the right to
confrontation, the Crawford Court drew two inferences about the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.47 First, the principal
evil that the Confrontation Clause intended to redress was the civillaw mode of criminal procedure that used ex parte examinations as
evidence against the accused. 48 The Founders designed the Clause to

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 48-49.
at 49.

(quoting State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794)).
(quoting Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103).
(citing State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 125 (1844)).
at 49-50.
at 50.
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prevent the injustice from trials like Raleigh's. 49 As a result, the Court
rejected the notions that the Confrontation Clause applied only to incourt testimony and that its application to out-of-court statements
introduced at trial was governed by the "law of evidence."5 0 The Court
qualified that its holding only included testimonial statements
because casual statements bear little resemblance to the civil-law
abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. 5 1 Without attempting to
formulate an exhaustive list of statements that should be classified as
testimonial, the Court adopted the generic view that statements made
under circumstances "which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
later trial" would constitute testimonial hearsay. 52 For example,
statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations
would be testimonial. 5 3
Second, the Court concluded that the Framers would not have
allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify and the defendant
had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 54 This holding
effectively overruled Roberts's "indicia of reliability" test.5 5 While the
Court acknowledged several well-established exceptions to the
hearsay rule by the end of the eighteenth century that allowed certain
statements to be admissible notwithstanding confrontation, it
concluded that most of these exceptions addressed nontestimonial
statements.56 The Court did not believe that the Framers intended
these exceptions to apply to testimonial statements against a criminal
defendant.5 7
4. Flaws of the Roberts Test
The Crawford Court concluded that the Roberts test had two
major flaws: subjectivity and unpredictability.5 8 The Court noted that
reliability itself is an "amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept"

49. Id.
50. Id. at 50-51.
51. Id. at 51.
52. Id. at 51-52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 52.
54. Id. at 53-54.
55. See id. at 60 (explaining that the Roberts test departs from historical understanding of
the Confrontation Clause because it is both too broad and too narrow).
56. See id. at 56.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 62-63.
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that depends heavily on which factors the judge considers and how
much weight he accords each of them.5 9
The lower court proceedings leading up to Crawford
exemplified both of the Roberts test's flaws. 6 0 Petitioner Michael
Crawford had stabbed a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife,
Sylvia.6 1 At his trial, the State played Sylvia's tape-recorded
statement to the police describing the stabbing, even though
Washington State's marital privilege prevented Crawford from crossexamining his wife. 62 Crawford objected that admitting the evidence
would violate his Confrontation Clause rights, but the trial court
overruled the objection after finding that the statements displayed
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under the Roberts test.6 3
The jury subsequently convicted Crawford of assault; however, the
Washington Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict after applying
a nine-factor test and concluding that Sylvia's statements did not bear
particularized
guarantees
of
trustworthiness. 64
Finally,
the
Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after finding
that Sylvia's statements did in fact bear particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.65
The Crawford Court characterized the state courts' conflicting
outcomes as a direct result of Roberts's "unpredictable and
inconsistent application."6 6 During the police interrogation, Sylvia had
initially implicated her husband in the stabbing and arguably
undermined his self-defense claim. 67 Nonetheless, the trial court
admitted her statement, listing several reasons why it was reliable. 68
The Washington Court of Appeals, however, listed several other
reasons why the statement was not reliable. 6 9 And lastly, the
Washington Supreme Court relied exclusively on the similarities
between Sylvia and her husband's statements, while disregarding
59. Id. at 63.
60. Id. at 65.
61. Id. at 38.
62. Id. at 40. The Washington State marital privilege generally bars a spouse from
testifying without the other spouse's consent, but does not extend to a spouse's out-of-court
statements admissible under a hearsay exception. See State v. Burden, 841 P.2d 758, 761 (Wash.
1992). Hence, the state invoked the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest to
admit Sylvia s statements. WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
63. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
64. Id. at 41 (noting that her statement contradicted one she had previously given).
65. Id. at 41-42 (noting that when a codefendant's confession is virtually identical to that
of a defendant, it may be deemed reliable).
66. Id. at 66.
67. Id. at 65.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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every other factor the lower courts had considered. 70 The Crawford
Court concluded that this case provided a prime example of Roberts's
shortcomings. 7 1
C. What Makes a Statement 'Testimonial" in Nature?
While the Crawford Court did not spell out a comprehensive
definition of "testimonial,"72 the Court revisited the issue in Davis v.
Washington. The Davis Court consolidated two domestic violence
cases. 7 3 Pointing out the contextual differences in the statements
made in each case, the Court used these two cases to illustrate the
differences between testimonial and nontestimonial statements.
In the first case, a woman (McCottry) called 911 during a
domestic disturbance with her ex-boyfriend Davis. 7 4 In the 911
recording, McCottry told the operator that Davis hit her and then ran
out of the house. 75 The operator asked her to identify Davis, which she
did.76 At Davis's trial, the court admitted the recording of McCottry's
exchange with the 911 operator without the opportunity for Davis to
confront McCottry.7 7 A jury subsequently convicted Davis of violating
a domestic no-contact order.7 8
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that
statements are nontestimonial "when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police to meet an
ongoing emergency."79 A 911 call fits this description because it
generally
describes
current
circumstances
requiring
police
80
assistance. The interrogation here differed from the one in Crawford,
the Court noted, because McCottry was not describing past events, but
rather events as they were happening.8 1 Moreover, any reasonable
listener would recognize that McCottry, unlike the witness Sylvia in
Crawford, was facing an ongoing emergency. 82 A third difference was
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Davis
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

65-66.
68.
v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006).
817 18.
818.
819.
819-20.
822.
827.
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that the objective purpose of what the authorities asked here was to
resolve an ongoing emergency rather than to learn about what
happened in the past. 8 3 And lastly, Sylvia's organized interview at a
station house was considerably more formal than McCottry's frantic
phone call. 8 4 Thus, the Court concluded that the primary purpose of
McCottry's interrogation was to enable police to meet an ongoing
emergency. 85 Her statements could not be testimonial, for she was
simply not testifying as a witness.8 6
The second case addressed in the Davis decision involved a
reported domestic disturbance at the home of Hershel and Amy
Hammon.87 When the police arrived and found evidence of domestic
assault, they took Amy aside and questioned her.88 Amy proffered an
affidavit stating that Hershel physically assaulted her and her
daughter.8 9 At Hershel's trial, the court admitted Amy's statements
and affidavit despite her absence from the trial, holding that under
state law, her affidavit was a "present sense impression" and her
statements were "excited utterances."9 0
The Supreme Court reversed Hershel's conviction, holding that
the statements here were similar to the testimonial statements in
Crawford.9 1 Specifically, the Court held that out-of-court statements
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there
is no ongoing emergency and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecutions. 92 Here, it was "entirely clear from the
circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into
possibly criminal past conduct." 93 The interrogation did not take place
in an emergency setting, and the police questioning Amy were not
trying to determine "what is happening," but "what happened."94
Although the interrogation was less formal than the one in
Crawford, it was nonetheless formal enough for Amy's statements to
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
impressions
or not.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.

at 828.
at 819.
at 820.
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1) and (2) except from the hearsay rule present sense
and excited utterances regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness
at
at
at
at

829, 834.
822.
829.
829-30.
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be considered testimonial. 95 The Court emphasized the fact that Amy's
interrogation was conducted in a separate room, away from her
husband, with the police officer documenting her replies for use in his
investigation.9 6 Her interrogation strongly resembled the civil-law ex
parte examinations that the Confrontation Clause was intended to
address. 9 7 Therefore, Hershel's Confrontation Clause rights were
violated when he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine Amy at
trial, regardless of whether Amy's statements fell under a hearsay
exception.
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts98 and Bullcoming v. New
Mexico,99 the Court further developed its "testimonial statement"
analysis in the context of certifying laboratory test results. In
Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that three certificates of analysis
offered to show the results of a forensic test performed on the
petitioner's seized substances were testimonial statements and hence
required that the petitioner be given the opportunity to confront the
analysts themselves.10 0 After opining that this case was a "rather
straightforward application" of Crawford, the Court rejected the
respondent's argument that the analysts were exempt from
confrontation because the certificates were results of "neutral,
scientific
testing" and were
not "prone to distortion or
1
0
1
manipulation."
The Court recited Crawford's holding that the
Confrontation Clause is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee, for "[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty." 102 Additionally, the Court noted that
such "neutral scientific testing" might not be all that neutral because
law enforcement agencies administer the majority of laboratories
producing forensic evidence. 103 As a result, forensic analysts
responding to a request from law enforcement officials "may feel
pressure-or have an incentive-to alter the evidence in a manner
favorable to the prosecution." 10 4

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 830.
Id.
See id.
557 U.S. 305 (2009).

99.

131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

557 U.S. at 310-11.
Id. at 312, 317.
Id. at 317 18 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)).
Id at 318.
Id.
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The Court reinforced Melendez-Diaz's holding in Bullcoming.
There, the prosecution also proffered a certificate of analysis of the
results of the petitioner's blood test signed by an analyst who was
unavailable at trial.105 Except this time, the government tried to call a
different analyst to verify the results.10 6 The testifying analyst was
familiar with the laboratory's testing procedures but had neither
participated in nor observed the petitioner's blood test.10 7 The Court
again found the defendant's inability to confront the original analyst a
Confrontation Clause violation.1 08 In so holding, the Court rejected the
New Mexico Supreme Court's rationales for allowing a third-party
analyst to verify the petitioner's test results-namely, that the
original analyst "was a mere scrivener" and that the analyst who
testified at trial was an adequate "surrogate."109 In response to the
first rationale, the Court again emphasized that the obvious reliability
of a testimonial statement does not dispense with the Confrontation
Clause.1 10 And in response to the second, the Court explained that
such "surrogate" testimony does not allow for the petitioner to expose
any "incompetence, evasiveness or dishonesty" on the certifying
analyst's part.11 1
D. History of the Language Conduit Theory and Its Application in the
Sixth Amendment Context pre-Crawford
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to
invoke the language conduit theory in dealing with the admissibility
of translated statements. 112 In United States v. Ushakow, the
defendant challenged the admissibility of an interpreter's testimony
regarding a conversation between the defendant and a drug dealer on
hearsay grounds. 113 The court rejected this argument, noting that the
interpreter "was translating and was merely a language conduit"
between the defendant and the drug dealer. 114 Thus, the court held
that the third party testimony fell within the same hearsay exception

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Bullcomingv. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710-12 (2011).
Id. at 2712.
Id.
Id. at 2715.
Id. at 2714-16.
Id. at 2715.
Id.
United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
Id.
Id.
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that allows admission of a defendant's own statements when the
defendant and another are speaking the same language. 115
The Second Circuit expanded on Ushakow's reasoning in
United States v. Da Silva.11 6 There, the hearsay issue was more
complicated. Instead of an interpreter testifying directly to what the
defendant had said, a Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
agent testified to the interpreter's translations.1 17 The court began its
analysis by noting that had the DEA agent been able to speak with
the defendant directly, his testimony of the defendant's statements
would have been nonhearsay admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).118
But since the DEA agent could not speak to the defendant directly and
could only testify to the interpreter's translations, there was an
additional level of hearsay to consider. 119 The court resolved this extra
hearsay step by invoking Rules 801(d)(2)(C) and (D). 120 Rule
801(d)(2)(C) excludes from the definition of hearsay a statement
offered against an opposing party if the statement is made by a person
whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subject.121
Similarly, Rule 801(d)(2)(D) excludes from the definition of hearsay
such a statement if made by the opposing party's agent or employee
concerning a matter within the scope of that relationship while it
existed. 122 The court concluded that when a court finds the translated
statements reliable, an agency relationship exists between an
interpreter and declarant that renders the former a mere language
conduit. 12 3 In such circumstances, the interpreter's statements do not
115. Id. The hearsay exception that the court was referring to is Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(A), which excludes statements made by an opposing party, if offered against that party,
from the definition of hearsay.
116. 725 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1983).
117. Id. at 829-30.
118. Id. at 831.
119. Id. When an interpreter is testifying directly to what the declarant said, as in
Ushakow, there is only one hearsay jump: declarant 4 interpreter 4 court. In these cases, the
jump can be resolved using Rule 801(d)(2)(A) if the statement is offered against the declarant.
But when the interpreter is absent from trial and a third-party witness is forced to testifyto the
interpreter's translations, an additional hearsay jump is present. The hearsay diagram now
becomes declarant 4 interpreter 4 third-party witness 4 court. While the first jump can still be
resolved by Rule 801(d)(2)(A), a different hearsay exception is needed to resolve the second jump.
See FED. R. EVID. 805 (requiring each hearsay jump to be covered by an exception in order for the
statement to be admissible).
120. Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 831.
121. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C).
122. Id. 801(d)(2)(D).
123. Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 832. The court also held that if the interpreter has sufficient
capacity and there is no motive to misrepresent, an agency relationship will be presumed. Id. at
831 32 (quoting 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(C)[01], at 801158 n.34 (1981)).
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fall within the definition of hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(C)
or (D). 12 4 After this case, many federal courts, including those in other
circuits, followed the Second Circuit's usage of the language conduit
theory. 125
Of the pre-Crawford cases that dealt with Confrontation
Clause challenges to translated, out-of-court statements, 126 courts
largely used Roberts's "indicia of reliability" test to support the
applicability of the language conduit theory. For instance, in United
States v. Nazemian, the Ninth Circuit held that the Roberts test
required the government to prove that the declarant's statements
were trustworthy. 127 It then applied the language conduit test to
determine whether the defendant could properly be viewed as the
declarant of the interpreter's translated statements. 128 In the end, it
affirmed the district court's finding that the interpreter's statements
were trustworthy after concluding that the factors of the language
conduit test weighed in the government's favor, such that a
"testimonial identity" existed between the defendant and the
interpreter. 129
Similarly, in United States v. Koskerides, the Second Circuit
allowed the admission of a third party's testimony regarding a
witness's translated statements against the defendant absent the
opportunity for cross-examination. 13 0 The witness testified for the
government through the aid of an interpreter but had passed away
before the defendant's trial. 131 Although the interpreter was not
present at trial either, the Second Circuit nonetheless admitted the
testimony because it deemed the interpreter a mere language conduit
and the witness's statements reliable. 132 The court concluded that a
finding of reliability "sufficient to admit a statement against penal
interest will normally satisfy Sixth Amendment concerns." 133 Thus,
because of the broad judicial discretion that the indicia of reliability
test gave to courts, the government often invoked the language

124.
125.
Beltran,
1985).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 832.
See United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525 27 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
761 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 859-60 (11th Cir.
The defendant in Da Silva did not raise a Confrontation Clause challenge.
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 525.
Id. at 526-28.
Id. at 527 28.
United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1134-36 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1134-35.
Id. at 1134-36.
Id. at 1136 (quoting United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 830 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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conduit theory to deny defendants the right to confront witnesses
without violating the Sixth Amendment.
In the wake of Crawford, however, the language conduit
theory's backbone appears weakened. As the Da Silva court explained,
the theory serves as an evidentiary tool that provides a hearsay
exception only when the translated statements are found reliable.134
But with Roberts's indicia of reliability test obsolete and Crawford's
new test in place, it is unclear whether the theory can survive
Confrontation Clause challenges when the translated statements are
testimonial in nature. The next Part will discuss the different ways
three federal circuits have analyzed the language conduit theory postCrawford.

III. ANALYSIS
Crawford created a circuit split over whether the language
conduit theory is still a viable means of avoiding confrontation. Of the
three circuits that have squarely addressed the issue post-Crawford,
however, only the Ninth Circuit has continued to consistently apply
the language conduit test in determining whether a defendant has a
constitutional right to confront his interpreter. 135 The Eleventh
Circuit, on the other hand, has rejected the test as inapplicable for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 136 while the Fourth Circuit has
declined to address whether the test can apply to testimonial
hearsay. 137
A. The Ninth Circuit Held that the Language Conduit Theory Is Not
Clearly Inconsistent with Crawford
As the first circuit to squarely address the applicability of the
language conduit theory to Confrontation Clause challenges postCrawford, the Ninth Circuit upheld the theory's validity in United

134. See United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 832 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining that an
agency relationship may properly exist only when "there is no motive to mislead and no reason to
believe the translation is inaccurate").
135. See United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139-41 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that
circuit precedent regarding the language conduit theory is not clearly inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
136. United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1328 29 (11th Cir. 2013).
137. See United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the
defendant's Confrontation Clause challenge to the admissibility of his interpreter's out-of-court,
translated statement because Crawford "does not bar the use of testimonial statements for
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted") (quoting United
States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 272 (4th Cir. 2010)).
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States v. Orm Hieng.138 In Nazemian, the Ninth Circuit had developed
several factors to consider when determining whether to attribute the
interpreter's statements to the defendant and, as a result, to treat the
interpreter and the defendant as identical for testimonial purposes.139
These "relevant factors" included which party supplied the
interpreter, whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or
distort, the interpreter's qualifications and language skills, and
whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent
with the statements as translated.140 If the factors weighed in favor of
the prosecution, then a witness could testify regarding statements
made by the defendant through an interpreter without risking
Confrontation Clause violations, because the defendant could not
claim that he was denied the opportunity to confront himself. 141
In response to the defendant's argument that Crawford
overruled Nazemian, the Orm Hieng court countered that its language
conduit jurisprudence was not "clearly irreconcilable" with the
Crawford line of cases. 142 While acknowledging that Crawford made it
clear that the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation to introduce
testimonial statements as evidence, the court attempted to distinguish
Nazemian on the basis that Crawford did not address the pertinent
question of whether "when a speaker makes a statement through an
interpreter, the Sixth Amendment requires the court to attribute the
statement to the interpreter." 14 3 As a result, the court concluded that
the Confrontation Clause simply did not apply because the defendant
could not complain that he was denied the opportunity to confront

himself. 14 4
The court further acknowledged that its language conduit
jurisprudence stems from "principles of the law of evidence" and that
there is "some tension" between the Nazemian analysis and the
Crawford line of cases. 145 By overruling Ohio v. Roberts, one could
read Crawford as essentially "divorcing Sixth Amendment analysis
from the law of evidence." 146 Nevertheless, the court refused to
abandon Nazemian because Crawford and its progeny "continue [d] to
138. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1141.
139. United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 28 (9th Cir. 1991).
140. Id. at 527.
141. See id. at 525-26 (explaining that "if the [translated] statements are viewed as
Nazemian's own, they would constitute admissions properly characterized as nonhearsay under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) or (D)").
142. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139-40.
143. Id. at 1140.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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use vocabulary of the law of evidence in their Sixth Amendment
analyses." 14 7 The court gave two examples of this: (1) the use of the
term "hearsay" when referring to the type of out-of-court statements
that may require confrontation and (2) the part of Crawford's holding
that allows admission of testimonial statements without confrontation
if they are offered "for purposes other than establishing the truth of
the matter asserted" (and therefore do not constitute hearsay). 148
Based on these aspects of Crawford, the court concluded that the
Crawford line of cases "provide [s] no clear guide with respect to the
interplay, if any, between the Confrontation Clause and the law of
evidence."149

The Ninth Circuit's decision to uphold the language conduit
theory reflects an emphasis on stare decisis.150 The language conduit
theory has long been an established judicial tool in American
jurisprudence, and the court did not want to overrule decades of
precedent in the wake of a case that did not directly address the
constitutional validity of the theory. By waiting for a "further
pronouncement from the Court,"15 1 the Ninth Circuit chose to take a
conservative approach by adhering to its precedent for the time being.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's primary stated justification
for upholding the theory appears weak and superficial. 152 While
acknowledging that Crawford could very well be read as divorcing the
Sixth Amendment analysis from the law of evidence, the Ninth Circuit
ultimately refused to endorse such a reading because Crawford and its
progeny continued to "use vocabulary of the law of evidence in their
Sixth Amendment analyses." 15 3 However, it is difficult to see why the
use of evidentiary terms such as hearsay in the Sixth Amendment
context would support the notion that the Court did not intend to fully
separate the two analyses. The Crawford Court could simply have
been trying to use a term familiar to the legal community to
differentiate out-of-court statements that require confrontation from
those that do not.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1140-41 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)).
149. Id. at 1141.
150. See id. at 1139 ("As a three-judge panel, we are bound by circuit precedent unless the
United States Supreme Court or an en banc court of our circuit has undercut the theory or
reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly
irreconcilable." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
151. Id. at 1141.
152. But see Powell, supra note 8, at 777 (supporting the Ninth Circuit's approach of
adhering to judicial determinations regarding when the language conduit theory is properly
applicable).
153. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1140.
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B. The Fourth Circuit Declined to Rule on Whether the Language
Conduit Theory Is Applicable to Testimonial Hearsay
In United States v. Shibin, the Fourth Circuit also validated
the use of the language conduit theory in the context of a
Confrontation Clause challenge. 154 There, the prosecution called FBI
Agent Coughlin as a witness to rebut testimony by defense witness
Al. 155 Coughlin had conducted Ali's pretrial interviews with the
assistance of an FBI interpreter and manually recorded what the
interpreter said. 156 During his testimony at trial, Ali denied making
some of the recorded statements. 15 7 After Ali concluded his testimony,
the government called Coughlin as a rebuttal witness, and Coughlin
testified that Ali did in fact make the statements he denied making. 158
On appeal, defendant Shibin argued that the district court
erred in admitting Coughlin's testimony because the interpreter's
absence from trial prevented Shibin from being able to challenge, by
cross-examination, the reliability of the out-of-court statements that
the government offered against him. 159 The Fourth Circuit rejected
Shibin's argument, however, because Crawford "does not bar the use
of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the
truth of the matter asserted."160 Because the statements were
introduced as prior inconsistent statements made by a witness rather
than for their truthfulness, the court held that they did not constitute
hearsay. 16 1 Therefore, the interpreter was nothing more than a mere
language conduit. 162 Shibin thus leaves open the question of whether
an out-of-court testimonial statement that is introduced to establish
the truth of the matter asserted-testimonial hearsay-can be
admitted under the language conduit theory.
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit chose to take a
somewhat conservative approach by deciding the case on narrow
grounds instead of ruling on the continued validity of the language
conduit theory. This court also seemed to place high value on stare
154. United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2013).
155. Id. at 247-48.
156. Id. at 248.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)).
161. Shibin, 722 F.3d at 248. Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) allows the admission of
extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement if the witness is given an
opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to
examine the witness about it, or if justice so requires.
162. Shibin, 722 F.3d at 248.
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decisis, for it purposely avoided the difficult constitutional question of
whether the language conduit theory can survive in the wake of
Crawford and its progeny. 163 But by avoiding controversy, the court
left behind much uncertainty. Future litigants will not know whether
the theory is still a viable safeguard against confronting interpreters
whose translated statements would ordinarily constitute testimonial
hearsay. It seems inevitable that the Fourth Circuit will have to
address the question eventually, unless the Supreme Court answers it
first.
C. The Eleventh Circuit Shielded Confrontation Clause Challenges
from the Reach of the Language Conduit Theory
In 2013, the Eleventh Circuit became the first and only circuit
thus far to explicitly reject the language conduit theory in a
Confrontation Clause challenge in the wake of Crawford.164 In United
States v. Charles, the defendant Charles had just arrived from Haiti
when IViami International Airport security detained her on suspicion
of using a fraudulent passport. 165 A Customs and Border Protection
("CBP") officer eventually used an over-the-phone interpreter service
to interrogate Charles. 16 6 The interpreter translated the officer's
questions from English to Creole for Charles and Charles's responses
from Creole to English for the officer. 167 At trial, the officer testified to
the truth of the interpreter's translated statements.168 The
government did not call the interpreter to testify, and the court
convicted Charles. 169 On appeal, Charles argued that admitting the
officer's testimony had violated her Sixth Amendment right to
confront and cross-examine the interpreter. 170
In reaching its decision that Charles had a Sixth Amendment
right to confront the interpreter, the Eleventh Circuit explained that
the interpreter, not Charles, was the declarant of the out-of-court
testimonial statements that the government sought to admit through

163. See id.
164. See United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) ("Even though an
interpreter's statements may be perceived as reliable [under the language conduit theory] and
thus admissible under the hearsay rules, the Court, in Crawford, rejected reliability as too
narrow a test for protecting against Confrontation Clause violations.").
165. Id. at 1320-21.
166. Id. at 1321.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1322.
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the CBP officer. 171 The court emphasized the fact that the CBP officer
testified as to the interpreter's statements, not those of Charles. 17 2
Given the nature of language interpretation, the interpreter's and
Charles's statements are not one and the same. 17 3 Rather than
interpreting word for word, interpreters convey meaning by
reproducing the content of the ideas being expressed. 174 In addition,
external forces, such as dialect and unfamiliarity of colloquial
expressions, often frustrate the interpretation of semantic meaning. 175
Thus, language interpretation necessarily requires the interpreter to
understand "the contextual, pragmatic meaning of a specific language"
so that "much of the information required to determine the speaker's
meaning is not contained in the words of the speaker, but instead is
supplied by the listener."1 76 Accordingly, the court held that Charles
had the constitutional right to confront her interpreter in order to
ascertain the accuracy of the translations. 177
The Eleventh Circuit outright rejected the government's
reliance on the circuit's precedent in United States v. Alvarez. 178 The
government argued that under Alvarez and the language conduit
theory, the defendant should be treated as the declarant of the
interpreter's English statements for Sixth Amendment purposes. 179 In
response, the court noted that Alvarez essentially adopted the Second
Circuit's reasoning in Da Silva in holding that a witness's testimony
about an interpreter's out-of-court translations was admissible as
nonhearsay under Rules 801(d)(2)(C) or (D). 180 The Alvarez court thus
viewed the interpreter, for hearsay purposes, as an agent of the
defendant, thereby making the interpreter's translated statements of
what the defendant said attributable to the defendant under the
language conduit theory. 181
However, the Eleventh Circuit noted that neither Alvarez nor
Da Silva held that the defendant was the declarant of the interpreter's
171. Id. at 1323.
172. Id. at 1324.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1324-25; see also Cassandra L. McKeown & Michael G. Miller, Say What?: South
Dakota's UnsettlingIndifference to Linguistic Minorities in the Courtroom, 54 S.D. L. REV. 33, 43
(2009) ("The parties involved, the setting, and the social context change the meaning,
connotation, and expected response stemming from identical language.").
177. See Charles, 722 F.3d at 1325.
178. See id. at 1325-29.
179. Id. at 1325.
180. Id.; see text accompanying notes 107-15 (explaining the Da Silva court's reasoning).
181. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1325.
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statements. 182 Just as in Alvarez, the Da Silva court admitted a law
enforcement officer's testimony of an interpreter's translations during
an interrogation under Rules 801(d)(2)(C) or (D), not Rule
801(d)(2)(A). 18 3 The Da Silva court explained that had the law
enforcement officer spoken directly with the defendant-and thus had
been able to testify to the defendant's answers-his testimony would
have been admissible as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).184 But
because the officer could not directly testify to what the defendant had
said, the court instead treated the interpreter as someone the
defendant had authorized to make a statement on the subject or as an
"agent" of the defendant. 185 As a result, the court admitted the
testimony under Rules 801(d)(2)(C) or (D). 186
From the holdings in Da Silva and Alvarez, the Charles court
recognized a meaningful distinction between a defendant's own
statements made directly to the testifying witness, which would be
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), and ones that are merely
attributable to the defendant when another person made them to the
testifying witness.18 7 Both types of statements are admissible but only
under distinct hearsay rules. 188 Which rule authorizes the admission
of the translated statements has important implications for
identifying the rightful declarant of the statements (defendant or
interpreter) and consequently for whether the defendant has a right to
confrontation. 189
The Charles court further opined that the characterization of
an interpreter as a language conduit in Da Silva and Alvarez for
purposes of the hearsay rules does not ensure the validity of such a
characterization for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.190 Da
Silva's rationale behind applying the language conduit theory-which
Alvarez adopted depended on the interpreter having no motive to
mislead and there being no reason to believe that the translation was
inaccurate. 191 In essence, the courts premised their use of the
language conduit theory on an assessment of the interpreter's
reliability and trustworthiness. 1 92 Although a statement's reliability
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1326-27.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id.

191. Id.

192. Id.
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may be sufficient to admit it under the hearsay rules of evidence, the
Charles court noted that Crawford clearly rejected reliability as too
Clause
narrow a test for protecting against Confrontation
violations. 193 After examining the Supreme Court's post-Crawford
jurisprudence, the Charles court concluded that where the admission
of a declarant's testimonial statements is at issue, the Confrontation
Clause permits admission only if the declarant is legitimately unable
to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant. 194
Of the three approaches taken thus far, the Eleventh Circuit's
approach of removing the language conduit theory from Sixth
Amendment analysis is most consistent with the spirit of Crawford
and its progeny. The language of Crawford strongly suggests that the
Court intended to divorce Sixth Amendment analysis from that of the
law of evidence, at least in the testimonial hearsay context.195 The
Eleventh Circuit explained that as an evidentiary rule, the language
conduit theory's purpose was to determine "competence and
trustworthiness" of an interpreter's translated statements.19 6 The
factors courts typically employ in determining whether the theory is
properly applicable also display such a purpose. Hence, when courts
find such translated statements reliable and trustworthy for
evidentiary purposes, courts have often admitted them under the
rationale that they are fairly attributable to the defendants
themselves. 19 7
But, as Crawford and its progeny made clear, the standard for
assessing reliability for Sixth Amendment purposes is stricter than
that for assessing reliability for evidentiary purposes. While the law of
evidence often gives judges the discretion to weigh different factors,
the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation to introduce testimonial
hearsay as evidence. 198 There is no good justification for relaxing the
Sixth Amendment standard when dealing with translated statements
that would normally constitute testimonial hearsay, or for
empowering judges to make a reliability determination that would
ultimately avoid the confrontation requirement altogether. Sensing
this peculiarity, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the admission of
193. Id.

194. Id. at 1328-29.
195. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) ("Where testimonial statements
are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave Sixth Amendment protection to the
vagaries of the rules of evidence.").
196. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1327 n.9.
197. E.g., United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525-28 (9th Cir. 1991).
198. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-69.
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translated,
testimonial
statements
required
confrontation. 199
Moreover, it held that defendants may raise two distinct admission
challenges to testimonial statements, one based on the law of evidence
and one based on the Sixth Amendment. 200 In sum, the Eleventh
Circuit approach strictly adheres to Crawford by explicitly divorcing
Sixth Amendment analysis from that of the law of evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit approach also has the benefit of reducing
uncertainty, unlike the Fourth Circuit's approach. Future litigants
now know that when the government is seeking to introduce any
testimonial statements against the defendant, the defendant has a
constitutional right to cross-examine the witness who made those
statements, even if the witness is a mere translator. In addition, the
government now knows that the defendant can raise both an
evidentiary and Confrontation Clause challenge, so it can prepare for
both.
Despite its clarity, the constitutional right to cross-examine
any witness who made testimonial statements that the prosecution is
seeking to admit carries certain drawbacks as well. Interpreters may
be less willing to translate out of fear that they may be required to
testify. Relatedly, law enforcement may be less willing to request the
aid of interpreters out of fear that some may falter when called to the
stand. This could result in less accurate translations or increased costs
associated with training and hiring more experienced translators. In
the long run, the efficiency of the government's language
interpretation system might suffer.
Another potential criticism of the Eleventh Circuit's approach
is that it departs from stare decisis. Unlike the Ninth and Fourth
Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit chose to depart from decades of
precedent that had allowed judicial determinations of reliability for all
out-of-court statements that the prosecution sought to admit.20 1
Instead, it interpreted Crawford as requiring the opportunity for
confrontation for all testimonial statements, including translated
ones.202

199. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1327 28.
200. Id. at 1328.
201. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d
States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831 32 (2d Cir. 1983).
202. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1323.

830, 859-60 (11th

Cir.

1985),

United
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Lastly, the Charles court could be faulted for deciding a
difficult constitutional question that did not need to be resolved in
deciding the case. Although the court held that the Creole
interpreter's statements were testimonial and hence required
confrontation, it ultimately ruled against the defendant because the
district court's decision was not plain error. 203 Specifically, an error
cannot be plain when there is no binding circuit or Supreme Court
precedent directly addressing the issue. 204 Because the case could have
been decided on this narrower ground (similar to the Fourth Circuit's
approach in Shibin), the special concurrence argued that the majority
went too far in deciding "a novel and difficult question of
constitutional law in an area where the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence is still evolving." 205 Declining to address an unnecessary
constitutional question carries its own benefits, the special
concurrence argued, for it pays tribute to the timeliness of the
interests affected and avoids expenditure of scarce judicial resources
on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case. 206
Because of these potential weaknesses, one could argue that the
Eleventh Circuit's approach is not optimal, despite the fact that it
most closely embodies the spirit of Crawford.
IV. SOLUTION: LIMITING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PROTECTION TO
TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
In order to resolve the circuit split in light of Crawford, it is
necessary to establish whether judges still have the power to
determine the admissibility of an interpreter's translated statements
absent the opportunity for cross-examination. First, this Part will
discuss why the answer must be no when such statements are
testimonial. Next, it will discuss why the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
behind vesting judges with such powers under the language conduit
theory is weak and inconsistent with Crawford. Finally, based on
Crawford's rationale, this Note proposes a two-prong test to determine
when out-of-court, translated statements should be afforded
confrontation protection in the absence of the interpreter. Specifically,
the court should first determine whether the statements are
testimonial in nature. If so, the burden of proof should shift to the
prosecution to show that the statements should nonetheless be
admissible as nonhearsay. If the prosecution fails the second prong,
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1330-31.
1331.
1332 (Marcus, J., concurring).
1334.
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then Crawford should apply, meaning the statements of the absent
interpreter are not admissible unless the defendant has had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.
A. Judicial Power to Admit Third-Party Testimony Absent the
Opportunity for ConfrontationIs Inconsistent with Crawford When
Such Statements Are Testimonial in Nature
The language conduit theory is essentially an evidentiary tool
used primarily to assess reliability and trustworthiness. 20 7 Crawford,
however, explained that reliability is an "amorphous, if not entirely
subjective, concept."208 The historical background of the Confrontation
Clause and Crawford's case history illustrate the dangers of leaving
such subjective determinations fully in judges' hands, an outcome the
Court strongly believed was contrary to the Framers' intent.209 The
Framers developed the Sixth Amendment in response to these
dangers, and it reflects a judgment that cross-examination is the best
means for assessing the reliability of testimonial statements. 210
As the inconsistent findings of the lower courts in Crawford
demonstrate, 211 there is a risk that the broad judicial discretion in
applying the factors of the language conduit test will lead to differing
results. For instance, a common factor of the language conduit test
evaluates the interpreter's qualifications and language skill. 2 12 How
qualified and skilled an interpreter must be is not clear. Certain
courts may find a degree in language translation sufficient despite
little practical experience, while other courts may find a certified
translator who recently obtained his license unqualified. The
Confrontation Clause-as interpreted by Crawford-eliminates such a
risk of judicial inconsistency by creating a categorical test that
dictates when cross-examination is required.
Similarly, the factor of the language conduit test that inquires
into whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort can
be indeterminate of reliability. 213 Subconscious biases pervade human
perception. Confrontation allows the trier of fact to evaluate a
witness's subtle biases and resulting reliability. The language conduit

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1327, United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
See supra Part I.B.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
Id. at 65-67.
E.g., Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139.
Id.
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theory, on the other hand, places the entire burden on judges to
identify these biases without ever meeting the witness.
Moreover, the language conduit factors that courts commonly
apply do not necessarily show that the translated statements are
reliable. As the Charles court explained, language interpreters do not
interpret words, but concepts, because the nature of language
translation involves many external forces. 2 1 4 These forces include
differences in dialect and unfamiliarity with colloquial expressions,
which frustrate the accurate interpretation of semantic meaning. 2 15
Given this inherent difficulty, even the most skilled and experienced
interpreters might not be able to capture exactly what the defendant
meant when dealing with certain subjects. 2 16 As a result, crossexamining the interpreter may be the better approach to ascertain
exactly what the defendant said.
Having a third-party witness testify to the truth of an
interpreter's out-of-court, translated statements is also analogous to
having a third-party analyst testifying to the accuracy of a defendant's
forensic tests. 2 17 In both instances, the original witness-interpreter
or certifying analyst-who interacted directly with the defendant is
absent from trial and replaced by a "surrogate," hindering the
defendant's ability to expose any potential "incompetence, evasiveness
or dishonesty" of the original witness via cross-examination. 2 18
Arguably, cases involving interpreters demand even stronger
Crawford protection because, unlike certifying analysts who merely
record test results, interpreters must take an active role in
communicating the speaker's intended message when his words lack a
direct translation. 219 And because the government often employs such
interpreters, they may also feel pressured to "alter the evidence in a
manner favorable to the prosecution." 220 All in all, application of the
language conduit test, at least where testimonial statements are
involved, is not consistent with the Crawford line of cases.
214. United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013).
215. Id.
216. See Presentation, Holly Mikkelson, The Art of Working with Interpreters: A Manual for
Health Care Professionals, Int. Interpretation Res. Center (1995), available at http://acebo.com/
papers/artintrp.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/QN3E-RA9P (identifying use of technical terms
and idioms as a common linguistic problem in health interpretation).
217. See supra PartII.C D (discussing Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming).
218. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714-16 (2011) (explaining why a
substitute analyst is insufficient to satisfy Crawford).
219. See Charles, 722 F.3d at 1324 (explaining that language interpreters typically convert
concepts in the foreign language to equivalent concepts in the native language), McKeown &
Miller, supra note 176, at 43 (explaining that in any speech setting, the parties work together to
generate meaning).
220. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009).
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B. The Ninth Circuit's Approach Is Inconsistent with Crawford's
Separation of the Sixth Amendment and Law of Evidence Analyses
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized "some tension" between
its language conduit analysis and the Crawford line of cases, the Orm
Hieng court refused to stray from circuit precedent, for it did not
believe that the Crawford line of cases "undercut the theory or
reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that
the cases are clearly irreconcilable." 2 2 1 On the contrary, with regard to
testimonial hearsay, Crawford did exactly that. The Orm Hieng court
acknowledged that the language conduit theory "stems from principles
of the law of evidence."222 Yet, Crawford undoubtedly held that when
testimonial hearsay is at issue, reliability must be assessed through
confrontation. 2 2 3 Hence, by upholding the applicability of the language
conduit theory to all third-party testimonies regarding the truth of an
interpreter's out-of-court translations, the Ninth Circuit's approach is
overbroad.
Despite the inconsistency with respect to Crawford's holding on
testimonial hearsay, the Orm Hieng court attempted to justify its
holding by pointing out that Crawford and its progeny "continue to
use the vocabulary of the law of evidence in their Sixth Amendment
analyses," such as the word hearsay. 224 This reasoning is weak,
however, for the mere use of evidence vocabulary gives little, if any,
support to the conclusion that "the Court's recent Confrontation
Clause cases provide no clear guide with respect to the interplay, if
any, between the Confrontation Clause and the law of evidence." 225
In fact, Crawford's use of the term hearsay serves precisely to
highlight the line between statements that require and those that do
not require confrontation. For while testimonial hearsay is the Sixth
Amendment's primary object, "[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at
issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the
States flexibility in their development of hearsay law ... as would an
approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny altogether." 226 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's observation that
courts may admit even testimonial statements without confrontation

221.
Gammie,
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Miller v.
335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 1140.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1140.
Id. at 1141.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 68.
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if they are offered for nonhearsay purposeS 2 2 7 underscores the
Crawford distinction between statements that do and do not require
confrontation. Crawford's Confrontation Clause analysis was limited
to testimonial hearsay, as the Court specifically noted that "[t]he
Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes

other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." 228 Therefore,
contrary to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, Crawford could hardly have
been clearer with respect to the relationship between the
Confrontation Clause and the law of evidence: where testimonial
hearsay is at issue, prior cross-examination of an absent witness is
required notwithstanding the statements passing any reliability tests
grounded in the law of evidence. 229
C. A Rule that Protects 'Testimonial Hearsay" Translationsfrom the
Language Conduit Theory Is Most Consistent with the
Spirit of Crawford
Crawford intended to limit the Confrontation Clause's reach to
testimonial hearsay; interpreters' translations should receive the
same degree of protection. In other words, when a third-party witness
testifies in court to an interpreter's out-of-court translations, the
defendant should have a right to cross-examine that interpreter only if
the statements constitute "testimonial hearsay." Such a rule is not
only consistent with the holdings in the Crawford line of cases, but
also reflects the Framers' intent that the reliability of testimonial
hearsay be assessed in a particular manner, namely under the
crucible of cross-examination. 230
Specifically, this Note proposes a two-step test to determine
whether translated statements should be afforded confrontation
protection when a third-party witness is testifying to those statements
in the absence of the interpreter. First, the court must determine
whether the statements are testimonial in nature in light of the
Crawford line of cases. For instance, if the statements were made
under circumstances objectively indicating that that the primary
purpose of the police interrogation was to enable police to resolve an
ongoing emergency (e.g., a 911 call), then the statements would be
nontestimonial under Davis. 2 3 1 But if the statements were made under
227.
228.
(internal
229.
230.
231.

Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1141.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985))
quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 53-54, 61.
Id. at 61.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), supra Part II.C.
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nonemergency circumstances, and the primary purpose of the police
interrogation was to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to future criminal prosecution, then the statements would
likely be testimonial. 232 Such testimonial statements would also
include ex parte testimony at preliminary hearings, formalized
testimonial materials such as affidavits and depositions, or, generally,
statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective
witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial. 233
If the court finds the statements to be testimonial, a
presumption of inadmissibility applies. To rebut this presumption, the
second prong of the proposed test shifts the burden of proof to the
prosecution to show that the statements should nonetheless be
admissible because they are not hearsay. 234 The prosecution can do so
by showing either that the statements are not offered for their truth or
that they fall within one of the Rule 801(d)(2) hearsay exemptions for
party-opponent admissions. 235
Of the Rule 801(d)(2) exemptions, the ones most likely to apply
are Rules 801(d)(2)(C) and (D), under which statements are usually
admitted if they pass the language conduit test.2 3 6 This Note proposes,
however, that the prosecution can only qualify for the 801(d)(2)(C)
or (D) exemptions upon a showing that the defendant affirmatively
authorized the interpreter to make a statement on his behalf. For
instance, prior to interrogating a non-English-speaking defendant, the
government agent could give the defendant a set of instructions
informing him that, if he is tried, he has a right to cross-examine his
interpreter in court, unless he waives this right by expressly

232. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, supra Part I.C.
233. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
234. Crawfords confrontation requirement only applies to testimonial hearsay. See
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985) (holding that
an accomplice's confession, when offered for nonhearsay purposes, raised no Confrontation
Clause concerns)).
235. The Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) exemptions from the hearsay definition would
not apply because they require the declarant to testify and be available for cross-examination.
Since the defendant is not the declarant of the interpreter's translations, and the proposed
solution only deals with cases where the interpreter is unavailable to testify, the 801(d)(1)
prerequisites will never be met. Some states treat Rule 801(d)(2) party admissions as exceptions
to the hearsay rule rather than exemptions from the hearsay definition. See, e.g.,
Statev. Richardson, No. COAo8-788, 2009 WL 678466, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2009). The
prosecutors in these jurisdictions will not be able to use Rule 801(d)(2) to rebut the presumption
of inadmissibility because Crawford subjects all testimonial hearsay to the confrontation
requirement. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.
236. E.g., United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1983).
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authorizing the interpreter to translate his statements as an agent on
his behalf. 2 3 7 A showing of implicit consent is not enough. 238
Evidentiary rules must yield when they would otherwise
arbitrarily or disproportionately infringe on constitutional rights. 239
Since the Confrontation Clause specifically aims to protect the right of
a defendant to confront the testimonial statements offered against
him, if a statement is found to be testimonial, there should be a higher
bar to its admissibility than under an ordinary analysis of the hearsay
rules. Otherwise, prosecutors can continue to circumvent the
Confrontation Clause, as in the pre-Crawford days, simply by
invoking the reliability factors of the language conduit theory to mold
the translated statements into nonhearsay. Such trivialization of the
role of testimonial statements is largely inconsistent with Crawford
and creates a high risk of abridging the constitutional right to
confrontation in the long run.
If the prosecution fails to meet its burden of proof, then the
translated statements would constitute testimonial hearsay, and
Crawford would apply. Under such circumstances, the statements of
an absent interpreter would not be admissible unless the interpreter
was unavailable to testify and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine him. 2 4 0 In these instances, the language
conduit test should not be applicable because reliability must be
determined in a specific manner: through confrontation. 2 4 1 On the
other hand, if the prosecution meets its burden of proving that the
translated statements are not hearsay, or if the court did not find the
statements to be testimonial in the first place, then Crawford would
not apply. Courts would then be free to utilize their own reliability
tools, including the language conduit theory, to determine
admissibility.

237. Such a waiver is also consistent with a defendant's ability to waive his Sixth
Amendment rights. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314 n.3 (2009).
238. Cf. Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 832 (holding that defendant's "conscious reliance" on
interpreter's translation amounted to authorization for hearsay purposes).
239. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55, 62 (1987) (invalidating a per se state evidentiary
rule that excluded all post-hypnosis testimony as impermissibly infringing on the defendant's
right to testify on his own behalf), Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)
(invalidating a state hearsay rule on the ground that it abridged the defendant's right to "present
witnesses in his own defense").
240. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).
241. Id. at 61.
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D. Potential Criticisms and Responses
One potential criticism of this solution is that it assumes an ex
ante assessment of the hearsay and testimonial natures of the
translated statements. In other words, the court should determine the
nature of the translated statements before deciding whether such
statements may be fairly attributed to the defendant himself under
the language conduit theory. The Orm Hieng court attacked such an
assumption by suggesting that the proper ex ante determination is
whether the interpreter's translated statements may be fairly
attributed to the defendant. 242 If So, then confrontation concerns would
not arise, for the subsequent Crawford analysis regarding the
testimonial nature of the statements would be limited to the original
speaker, and the defendant cannot complain that he was denied the
opportunity to confront himself.2 4 3 Thus, selecting the initial inquiry
has important consequences, and it is not clear why courts should
address the nature of the translated statements before the identity of
the original speaker.
Although no court has squarely addressed this issue aside from
the Ninth Circuit, assessing the nature of the translated statements
ex ante is more consistent with the spirit of Crawford. Crawford held
that the reliability of all testimonial hearsay must be assessed via
confrontation, 2 4 4 So, logically, the first issue that should be resolved is
whether the translated statements are hearsay and testimonial.
Beginning with the speaker's identity, in an attempt to avoid the
confrontation issue altogether, undermines Crawford's intent to divest
judges of the power to assess the reliability of testimonial
statements. 245 By first determining that an interpreter's translated
statements may be fairly attributed to the defendant without regard
to whether the statements are hearsay or testimonial in nature, courts
could bypass Crawford's explicit holding and make certain reliability
determinations forbidden by the Sixth Amendment. Crawford could
not have intended such a loophole.

242. United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012).
243. Id. at 1139, United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525 26 (9th Cir. 1991).
244. 541 U.S. at 61-62.
245. See id. at 61 ("Admitting [testimonial] statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.").
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Another potential criticism of this solution is that it may
actually leave too many types of translated statements outside the
ambit of confrontation protection. Specifically, few translated
statements may pass the second prong, for after hearing the Mirandatype instructions, many defendants are likely to authorize an
interpreter to make statements on their behalf and consequently
waive their confrontation rights. This is due to the defendants' fear
that, despite instructions to the contrary, not authorizing an
interpreter to make statements on their behalf might give rise to an
inference of guilt.
Even if the proposed solution has this effect, however,
Crawford never indicated that nonhearsay statements should be
afforded the same degree of constitutional protection as hearsay
statements. The hearsay exemptions are clearly stated in the Federal
Rules of Evidence and have long been invoked to admit statements
that would likely otherwise be inadmissible as hearsay. The fact that
this proposed solution might end up classifying and admitting a high
percentage of translated statements as nonhearsay is thus not
contrary to the historical norm. On a similar note, this solution may
also ensure the survival of the language conduit theory in a large
number of cases, an ideal result because courts would not have to
completely abandon such a pervasive and firmly grounded judicial
doctrine. By selectively preserving the language conduit theory while
requiring confrontation in the remaining "testimonial hearsay" cases,
this proposed solution takes a narrow approach in safeguarding the
spirit of Crawford.
V. CONCLUSION
In overruling Roberts's indicia of reliability test and affording
defendants an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who make
testimonial statements against them, Crawford's holding casts doubt
on the language conduit theory. While the Ninth Circuit does not
believe that applying the theory to all third-party testimony regarding
out-of-court, translated statements would clearly run afoul of
Crawford, the Eleventh Circuit now requires confrontation when such
statements are testimonial in nature. In order to resolve this split,
courts should adopt a two-prong test to determine when a defendant
has a right to confront an interpreter. First, courts should determine
whether the statements are testimonial in nature. If so, the burden of
proof would shift to the prosecution to show that the statements
should nonetheless be admitted as nonhearsay. Such a rule is likely to

1530

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:5:1497

preserve the language conduit theory in a large number of cases while
simultaneously promoting Crawford's key values.
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